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**Activities of the Joint Inspection Unit**

**Activities of the Joint Inspection Unit**

**Report by the Director General**

Provides information on the activities of the Joint Inspection Unit in accordance with the pilot scheme of follow-up to recommendations in keeping with decision IDB.24/Dec.11.

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## I. Introduction

1. The Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) became a subsidiary organ of the Industrial Development Board by its decision IDB.1/Dec.22. A pilot scheme of follow-up to JIU recommendations was outlined in document IDB.24/18 and subsequently approved in decision IDB.24/Dec.11. In accordance with the provisions therein, one regular Board session per year will consider JIU reports (except in certain specified cases).
2. A total of six JIU reports<sup>1</sup> and three notes have been issued since the most recent Board document covering this subject (IDB.31/4 dated 28 March 2006). The present document provides the Organization's comments on those reports that are of direct or some relevance to UNIDO. Recommendations of direct relevance to UNIDO are presented in the annex.

### Recent JIU reports and notes

JIU/REP/2005/9 – Common services in Vienna: Buildings Management Services

JIU/REP/2006/1 – Evaluation of results-based budgeting in peacekeeping operations

JIU/REP/2006/2 – Oversight lacunae in the United Nations system

JIU/REP/2006/3 – Follow-up to the management review of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

JIU/REP/2006/4 – A second review of the implementation of headquarters agreements concluded by United Nations system organizations: Provision of headquarters premises and other facilities by host countries

JIU/REP/2006/5 – Towards a United Nations humanitarian assistance programme for disaster response and reduction: Lessons learned from the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster

JIU/NOTE/2005/1 – Review of the implementation of results-based management in the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)

JIU/NOTE/2005/2 – Review of the management of the United Nations laissez-passer

JIU/NOTE/2006/1 – Goodwill Ambassadors in the United Nations system

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<sup>1</sup> All JIU reports and notes can be accessed via the JIU website <http://www.unju.org/>. The report or note summary included in this document is based on the summary presented by the JIU in its Report to the General Assembly (A/62/34).

## **II. Reports and notes submitted by the Joint Inspection Unit of direct relevance to UNIDO**

### **A. Common services in Vienna: Buildings Management Services (JIU/REP/2005/9)**

3. The management of the Vienna International Centre (VIC) buildings complex has been under the responsibility of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) since 1977. The services are provided through Buildings Management Services (BMS). BMS were a central part of a JIU report issued in 2002 on Common and Joint Services of the Organizations of the United Nations system located at Vienna (JIU/REP/2002/12).

4. At the request of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the JIU included in its 2005 workplan a more detailed review of BMS. The JIU aimed at responding to concerns of the IAEA regarding the oversight, transparency and accountability of BMS as a key element in the functioning of the VIC.

5. The final report examined the current allocation of common services in Vienna, the oversight role of Member States, transparency and accountability, monitoring and decision-making, the role of external audit, and possibilities for outsourcing. The JIU report is solely addressed to the IAEA, its External Auditors and Member States.

#### **UNIDO comments**

6. Although the report was requested by and is addressed to the IAEA, in order for the JIU to conduct its work, UNIDO, as the managing organization for BMS, provided unrestricted access to documents and personnel on BMS. UNIDO took note of the recommendations contained in the final report, which was shared with the Organization. Furthermore, UNIDO is pleased to inform Member States that, at the time of the issuance of the report, various actions to improve cooperation and collaboration had already been undertaken at senior level as well as operational level of both organizations to ensure that all common services at the VIC, including but not limited to BMS, are carried out in a transparent and cooperative manner.

### **B. Oversight lacunae in the United Nations system (JIU/REP/2006/2)**

7. The report examined the role, responsibilities and functions of the external and internal oversight bodies in the United Nations system. The report defined the United Nations Board of Auditors, the external auditors of the specialized agencies and the IAEA, and the JIU as operational oversight mechanisms, while the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, the Committee for Programme and Coordination and the International Civil Service Commission are considered policy/review oversight mechanisms. The report further defined internal audit (often also synonymous for inspection), investigation and evaluation as internal oversight mechanisms.

8. The report highlighted that oversight is ultimately the responsibility of Member States and that it goes substantially beyond internal audit. The

recommendations contained in the report are intended to help Member States discharge this crucial responsibility.

9. The report recommended, *inter alia*:
- The establishment of an independent external “oversight board” in each organization, analogous to the envisaged United Nations Independent Audit Advisory Committee, but composed of expert members nominated and elected by Member States to represent their collective interests. This body would, *inter alia*, prior to submittal to the governing bodies, review the proposed fee and terms of engagement of the external auditors as well as the budget of the internal auditors, coordinate the workplan of external and internal auditors and receive a copy of all oversight reports. Further, the JIU proposed that the oversight head would have unrestricted access to the oversight board, to protect him/her in case of differences with the Executive Head;
  - Peer review of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, the International Civil Service Commission and the JIU;
  - The consolidation of audit, inspection, investigation and evaluation functions into a single office under the head of internal oversight reporting directly to the Executive Head;
  - Adequate budgetary independence for the external and internal oversight bodies;
  - The establishment of a minimum in-house capacity for investigations;
  - The appointment of a qualified internal oversight head, subject to consultation and prior consent of the governing bodies; and termination for just cause, subject to review and consent of the governing bodies;
  - Term limits for external auditors and for the head of internal oversight, with no expectation of employment within the same United Nations organization at the end of the term;
  - Better reporting modalities of internal oversight activities to governing bodies, as well as proactive oversight recommendation follow-up and quality assurance mechanisms;
  - Improvement in reporting of wrongdoing and establishment of an ethics office, as well as financial disclosure statements for all staff and elected officials at the D-1 level and above;
  - Better coordination among external and internal oversight bodies throughout the United Nations system.

#### **UNIDO comments**

10. UNIDO notes that the JIU report was issued before changes were introduced to UNIDO’s organizational structure. Therefore, some information included in the JIU report pertaining to UNIDO is now outdated. In the following paragraphs (in the order of the points above) UNIDO considered those JIU recommendations relevant to the Organization, taking into account the current organizational structure.

11. Overall, UNIDO considers that when making recommendations the JIU did not give sufficient consideration to the size, mandate, specificities and budget of the United Nations system organizations and their oversight units.

12. Introducing an oversight board as prescribed by the JIU should be very carefully and pragmatically considered, taking into account the size and budget of the organization, as well as the value added of such a body to the organization and its stakeholders.

13. UNIDO disagrees with the JIU's position to consolidate all oversight activities into one organizational entity. This recommendation does not reflect the differences in the focus, process, methodologies and audience of evaluation, audit/inspection and investigation, nor does it take into account the variation in individual agencies' mandates, and their associated structures and practices. UNIDO considers that these "professions" are different and in order to ensure that perception and activities are clear and focused, UNIDO decided to separate control and governance – audit/inspection and investigation – from review of and learning on substantive matters – evaluation. This is mirrored in the current organizational structure, the former activities being the mandate of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (IOS) reporting to the Director-General, the latter that of the Evaluation Group (EVA) included in the Bureau for Organizational Strategy and Learning. Notwithstanding the above, UNIDO is of the opinion that, though different, the two "professions" are complementary. Therefore, UNIDO fosters cooperation and coordination between the two units through professional and constant dialogue, as well as – to the extent possible – through coordinated work programmes.

14. The standards proposed by the JIU for budget and staffing levels of audit/inspection and evaluation have the merit of being simple to apply – although the JIU did not provide any rationale on the methodology used to come to these prescribed levels. However, these standards do not take into account the diversity of situations that United Nations organizations face, and thereby the staffing and budget levels necessary to discharge oversight responsibilities towards Member States.

15. Similarly, regarding the establishment of a minimal in-house investigative capacity, UNIDO finds the JIU approach too prescriptive, assuming that there is a constant stream of investigative activities and that an investigator could cover all types of situations. UNIDO is of the opinion that other possibilities, for example temporarily using outside expertise through the hiring of specialist firms or the secondment of investigator(s) from another United Nations entity, could be considered as alternative viable options.

16. Currently, the appointment and termination of the IOS and EVA heads at UNIDO follow the same procedures as any other UNIDO staff member. Non-renewable tenure and no expectation of further employment in the Organization could be given consideration.

17. At present, upon request from the policymaking organs, in accordance with decision (IDB.29/Dec.7), EVA reports on its activities biennially. Modalities for reporting on IOS activities are currently under consideration, learning from other United Nations organizations. EVA reports are widely available and posted on the UNIDO website. IOS reports (both audit inspection and investigation) have restricted distribution in view of the sensitivity and confidentiality of the

information contained therein. Regarding recommendation follow-up, both EVA and IOS have mechanisms in place and look for economies of scale in researching common follow-up tools.

18. In terms of quality assurance, EVA and IOS are subject to the External Auditor's review, as well as to professional external reviews as per their respective professional standards. The Professional Practices Framework for Internal Auditing already prescribes an external quality assessment every five years. UNIDO, like all other United Nations organizations, abides by the Framework. Modalities for external assessment of the evaluation function are currently under review in the United Nations system. Further, in the last 18 months, EVA contributed to the peer review of the evaluation function of other United Nations entities on two occasions.

19. When reporting information to IOS, and in particular alleged wrongdoing – to the extent it is in good faith – UNIDO assures confidentiality and protection for staff through the IOS Charter and the Fraud Awareness and Prevention Policy (both currently being revised to take account of the new structure). However, the need for a formal whistleblower policy, based on best practices and the policy recently introduced in New York, is currently being considered. The establishment of a full-fledged ethics office may not be the preferred option given the size and resources at UNIDO. Therefore, alternative solutions and actions to raise integrity and ethics are currently under consideration by the Secretariat.

20. UNIDO actively supports cooperation and coordination in the United Nations system, including on internal oversight. IOS is deeply involved in devising new system-wide coordination oversight mechanisms, for instance the audit framework for multi-donor trust funds. IOS and EVA are both very active in their respective oversight communities.

21. UNIDO is committed to oversight and both IOS and EVA discharge their mandates to the extent of resources at their disposal.

**C. A second review of the implementation of headquarters agreements concluded by United Nations system organizations: Provision of headquarters premises and other facilities by host countries (JIU/REP/2006/4)**

22. Following the JIU report on headquarters agreements, which focused on human resources issues affecting staff (JIU/REP/2004/2), the objective of this second JIU review was to contribute to effective and consistent practices and policies in the provision of headquarters premises and other facilities throughout the United Nations system.

23. The report concluded that headquarters agreements are, more or less, identical in terms of structure and content, and that there are generally no concerns regarding the texts of these agreements. However, there are concerns about the efficiency and adequacy of implementation and interpretation of certain provisions of the agreements in some host countries. Moreover, given the significant economic and other benefits that host countries enjoy from the presence of the headquarters of United Nations system organizations, the report recommended that more generous facilities should be granted in the acquisition, provision and refurbishment of such headquarters premises.

24. The report highlighted the need to foster good relations with host countries and to establish formal forums to ensure dialogue in this regard. It also recommended the establishment of mechanisms to ensure funding for major repairs, and reiterated the importance of the timely issuance of visas for staff and officials travelling on United Nations business. It further covered security issues in light of the headquarters minimum operating security standards.

#### **UNIDO comments**

25. UNIDO has already implemented a number of the recommendations made in the report, for instance reminding staff of their obligations and setting up a separate fund for major repairs and refurbishments. Further, within the limits of its resources, UNIDO would support, together with the other VBOs, the establishment of a joint forum in Vienna to enhance relations with the host country and deal with issues or questions as appropriate.

### **D. Review of the management of the United Nations laissez-passer (JIU/NOTE/2005/2)**

26. In 2003, the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services undertook audits of the management and control of the United Nations laissez-passer (UNLP). Given the many concerns raised by the audits, and the request by the General Assembly in its resolution 59/270 of 23 December 2004 that the Secretary-General ensure the development of appropriate Organization-wide rules, policies and procedures for managing the laissez-passer, the JIU undertook a system-wide review of the management of the document. The review focused on the use and management of the laissez-passer by the United Nations, specialized agencies and IAEA, and aimed at ensuring effective and consistent policies, procedures and practices regarding issuance, use, safekeeping, renewal and retrieval.

27. The note stressed the need for a centralized procedure for the issuance of the laissez-passer, including the establishment of a centralized database of accurate updated information, so as to enhance the management, control and monitoring of all such documents. The Department of Safety and Security of the United Nations Secretariat was assigned the task of preparing an action plan to address the concerns raised on, inter alia, multiple issuance of UNLPs or loss of documents. Further, the JIU recommended that each organization audit its internal management of UNLPs.

#### **UNIDO comments**

28. UNIDO does not support the recommended centralization of UNLP issuance as this will adversely affect and indeed delay operations and implementation. At present, UNIDO benefits from the prompt issuance of UNLPs by the United Nations Office at Vienna in a maximum of two days after application. This deadline could never be met if issuance was centralized in New York.

29. Regarding the concerns mentioned in the JIU note (duplicate/multiple UNLP issuances, lack of signature date on the UNLP, obligations not explained to new UNLP holder, missing return of document upon separation), UNIDO set in place clear procedures and control points in the Human Resource Management (HRM) Branch for handing over UNLPs and returning them upon separation.



Further, HRM keeps central records of staff members who have been given a UNLP, with laissez-passer number and validity date. Therefore, UNIDO is of the opinion that the measures in place are sufficient to ensure proper administration of UNLPs.

30. In view of the above comments, UNIDO does not support the need to revisit the memorandum of understanding signed on 31 March 1977 and amended on 20 November 1998, delineating responsibilities for common services among the VBOs, although it does not contain a specific mention of the management of UNLPs.

## **E. Goodwill Ambassadors in the United Nations system (JIU/NOTE/2006/1)**

31. The JIU review covered the 16 organizations of the United Nations system that have Goodwill Ambassador programmes in place, including most funds and programmes and four specialized agencies. The review aimed at assessing, in the light of the proliferation of Goodwill Ambassadors, how effectively such programmes are managed, determining the level of resources needed to meet established objectives and identifying and disseminating best practices.

32. The review confirmed the valuable contribution of these people to the aims of the United Nations. It also acknowledged that the issuance of guidelines for the designation of Goodwill Ambassadors and Messengers of Peace constituted an important step towards harmonizing the various programmes, serving as a baseline for many organizations to develop their own more detailed guidelines.

33. The review nevertheless found that there are too many Goodwill Ambassadors (over 400) in the United Nations system under numerous different titles and categories. Not all of them are as well known and active, highly committed and available as would be expected. Their terms of service are not limited, which would prevent inevitable fatigue and weariness, while diversity, both in terms of individual profiles and of geographical and cultural regions, is not always ensured, limiting their ability to reach out to all types of audiences. In addition, since in some instances celebrities defend the same or similar causes in different organizations, their work may be duplicative and their messages blurred. The review revealed that more focus is needed to raise the profile of the programmes and that indicators of success as well as monitoring and reporting systems are required to effectively measure impact. Further, better coordination among United Nations organizations should be achieved through the exchange of experiences and the organization of joint activities.

### **UNIDO comments**

34. UNIDO has already implemented most of the applicable recommendations made by the JIU. UNIDO uses solely the title of Goodwill Ambassador. These Ambassadors are leading industrialists, businesspeople or public figures who have made a significant contribution to industrial development in their respective fields. Their number is low and their mandate of limited duration. The objective and success indicators of the programme are clearly established. However, there are no specific terms of reference for the Goodwill Ambassadors. Funding by UNIDO is limited to travel costs and per diems, and in part the Organization already applies

self-financing arrangements for these costs to the extent possible. The programme will also be subject to evaluation in order to assess its impact in view of its funding.

### **III. Reports of indirect relevance to UNIDO**

#### **A. Evaluation of results-based budgeting in peacekeeping operations (JIU/REP/2006/1)**

35. This report does not include any recommendations specifically related to UNIDO.

#### **B. Towards a United Nations humanitarian assistance programme for disaster response and reduction: Lessons learned from the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster (JIU/REP/2006/5)**

36. UNIDO was not involved in this inspection and none of the recommendations were addressed to UNIDO directly. However, UNIDO considers that emergency, humanitarian relief, rehabilitation and recovery efforts should be programmed and managed in an integrated fashion. Therefore, UNIDO would support a system-wide framework for the "coordination of humanitarian assistance and disaster reduction and response activities" which would include recovery programmes, reconstruction and development aspects.

### **IV. Work programme 2007**

37. As required under the statute of the JIU, all participating organizations are approached by the JIU for suggestions for work to be performed in the following year. Such proposals should reflect items which are high on the agenda of the United Nations system; have the potential to improve the way the system delivers programmes or services; are system-wide in scope; can lead to improved efficiency and/or potential savings; and where possible are synergetic with other reports of the JIU or other internal oversight bodies and/or the Board of Auditors, while avoiding duplication of effort (General Assembly resolution 59/75 dated 22 April 2004). Furthermore, the General Assembly decided in resolution 59/267 (adopted 7 March 2005) that the JIU shall mainly focus on identifying means to improve management and to ensure that optimum use is made of available resources.

38. UNIDO noted the complementarity between the JIU mandate and the terms of reference of the Chief Executives Board for Coordination's High-level Committee on Management (CEB/HLCM). Currently, organizations of the United Nations system are requested to provide inputs to the work programme of both the JIU and the CEB/HLCM. Therefore, to foster greater coherence in the programmes and activities of the organizations of the United Nations system and improvements in management policies and practices throughout the system, UNIDO is of the view that the preparation of the annual work programme of the JIU would benefit from closer cooperation with the work planning processes of the CEB/HLCM and its network of specialized bodies, particularly the Finance and Budget Network and the Human Resources Network.

39. On 7 March 2007, the JIU provided UNIDO with a copy of its 2006 report and 2007 work programme (A/62/34)<sup>2</sup> which was considered by the Fifth Committee at its meeting on 21 March 2007 and which the General Assembly took note of on 4 April 2007. Of the 11 topics on the 2007 JIU work programme, five are of some interest to UNIDO: (a) National competitive examination as a recruitment tool; (b) Special Representative of the Secretary-General and United Nations Resident Coordinator; (c) Corporate consultancies in United Nations system organizations; (d) Corporate sponsoring in organizations of the United Nations system; and (e) Headquarters agreements and other host country agreements: compliance issues.

## V. Action required of the Board

40. In compliance with the provisions of the Statute of JIU and resolution 48/221 of the General Assembly the Board may wish to take note of the information contained in the present document and provide guidance for further action.

### Abbreviations used in this document

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
BMS	Buildings Management Services
CEB/HLCM	Chief Executives Board for Coordination's High-level Committee on Management
EVA	Evaluation Group, Bureau for Organizational Strategy and Learning
HRM	Human Resource Management Branch
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICSC	International Civil Service Commission
IOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
UNLP	United Nations Laissez-Passer
VBO	VIC-based Organizations
VIC	Vienna International Centre

<sup>2</sup> The programme was drawn from the submissions made to the JIU, the requested focus of the JIU on management matters, common issues on the agendas of the legislative bodies of these organizations, and the JIU internal management assessments, as well as the proposals of individual inspectors.

## Annex

## Reports of the Joint Inspection Unit of Relevance to UNIDO

JIU/REP/2006/2 - Oversight Lacunae in the United Nations System		
	Recommendation	For Action
1	The legislative bodies of each United Nations system organization should establish an independent external oversight board composed of five to seven members, all of whom shall be elected by Member States to represent the governing bodies' collective interests. They should have prior experience in areas of oversight. In carrying out their functions, they should be assisted by at least one external adviser with recognized expertise in oversight matters to be chosen by them.	Governing Bodies
3	(b) The legislative bodies should decide that the proposed fees and terms of engagement of the external auditors should be submitted to the respective governing body through the external oversight board of each organization.	Governing Bodies
4	The legislative bodies should decide that the members of ACABQ, ICSC and JIU and other similar bodies within the United Nations system be subject to a uniform regime barring them from any appointment, including as a consultant, in the United Nations system organizations for which they have had oversight responsibilities both during their service and within three years of ceasing that service.	Governing Bodies
5	The legislative bodies should direct that term limits be established for the external auditors of the United Nations system organizations, and that the staff that have worked as external auditors be barred from taking up executive functions for a period of three years in those organizations for which they have had oversight responsibilities.	Governing Bodies
6	Executive heads should review the current structure of internal oversight in their respective organizations and ensure that: (a) Audit, inspection, investigation and evaluation functions are consolidated in a single unit under the head of internal oversight reporting directly to the executive head; (b) Any functions other than the four oversight functions should be positioned elsewhere in the secretariats and not in the internal oversight unit.	Secretariat
7	The legislative bodies of each United Nations system organization should direct their respective executive heads to: (a) Review the capacity of the organization to conduct investigations and put forward proposals for the establishment of a minimum in-house capacity for investigations; (b) Ensure that a minimum investigations capacity comprises qualified and experienced professional investigators who would not be subject to rotation within that organization; (c) Ensure that investigations entities are authorized to initiate investigations without interference from senior management in the respective organizations. (d) Ensure that independent reporting procedures for investigations are established (see recommendation 11 below).	Governing Bodies

<b>JIU/REP/2006/2 - Oversight Lacunae in the United Nations System</b>		
	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>For Action</b>
<b>8</b>	The legislative bodies of each United Nations system organization should direct their respective executive heads to establish similar policies and procedures to those recently established by the United Nations to provide protection against retaliation for reporting misconduct, and these should be widely publicized.	Governing Bodies
<b>9</b>	The legislative bodies of each organization should decide that the proposed budget of the internal oversight entity should be drawn up by the entity itself and submitted to the external oversight board, together with any comments of the executive head, for review and transmittal to the appropriate governing body.	Governing Bodies
<b>10</b>	With respect to the appointment of the head of internal oversight, the legislative bodies in each organization should decide that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Qualified candidates should be identified on the basis of a vacancy announcement that should be widely publicized;</li> <li>(b) Appointment should be subject to consultation and prior consent of the governing body;</li> <li>(c) Termination should be for just cause, and should be subject to the review and consent of the governing body;</li> <li>(d) A non-renewable tenure of five to seven years should be established, with no expectation of any further employment within the same United Nations organization at the end of the term.</li> </ul>	Governing Bodies
<b>11</b>	The legislative bodies in each organization should direct their respective executive heads to ensure that the following minimum standards are in place for reporting on internal oversight: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Internal oversight reports to be submitted to the executive head;</li> <li>(b) An annual internal oversight summary report to be submitted independently to the oversight board for its review, with the comments of the executive head submitted separately;</li> <li>(c) Individual internal audit, inspection and evaluation reports to be provided to the oversight board, on request;</li> <li>(d) Individual investigation reports to be provided to the oversight board, on request, with due safeguards for confidentiality.</li> </ul>	Governing Bodies
<b>12</b>	With respect to the follow-up of oversight recommendations, the legislative bodies in each organization should direct their respective executive heads to ensure that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) A database is created to monitor the follow-up of all oversight recommendations, and pending recommendations are monitored and followed up on a timely basis;</li> <li>(b) The annual internal oversight summary report to the oversight board contains a summary of oversight recommendations not yet fully implemented.</li> </ul>	Governing Bodies
<b>13</b>	The legislative bodies in each organization should direct their respective executive heads to ensure independent quality assessment, for example through peer review, of the internal oversight entity, at least once every five years.	Governing Bodies

<b>JIU/REP/2006/2 - Oversight Lacunae in the United Nations System</b>		
	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>For Action</b>
<b>14</b>	The legislative bodies in each organization should adopt the following standards in respect of internal oversight: (a) For those organizations that manage biennial resources of at least US\$250 million, an internal oversight unit is justified; (b) For those organizations that manage biennial resources of less than US\$250 million, internal oversight services should be in-sourced to any other organization in the United Nations system that has the capacity to respond.	Governing Bodies
<b>15</b>	The legislative bodies in each organization should direct their respective executive heads to put forward proposals for the: (a) Establishment of an ethics function with clear terms of reference which should be publicized through the organization's website and other media; (b) Establishment of a post of ethics officer at the D-1/P-5 level, as appropriate, within the office of the executive head; (c) Mandatory integrity and ethics training for all staff, particularly newly recruited staff.	Governing Bodies
<b>16</b>	The legislative bodies in each organization should direct their respective executive heads to put forward proposals for the: (a) Establishment of confidential financial disclosure requirements for all elected officials and all staff at the D-1 level and above, as well as those staff mentioned in paragraph 50 above; (b) Annual filing of the financial disclosure statements to the ethics office(r) for review.	Governing Bodies
<b>17</b>	The legislative bodies of each United Nations system organization should direct their respective oversight boards to establish an effective mechanism for coordination and cooperation among the external and internal oversight bodies on a system-wide basis.	Governing Bodies

<b>JIU/REP/2006/4 - A second review of the implementation of headquarters agreements concluded by United Nations system organizations: Provision of headquarters premises and other facilities by host countries</b>		
	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>For Action</b>
<b>1</b>	Executive heads of United Nations organizations should remind their officials and staff members of their obligation to be exemplary in respecting the laws, regulations, traditions and habits of the host countries.	Secretariat

<b>JIU/REP/2006/4 - A second review of the implementation of headquarters agreements concluded by United Nations system organizations: Provision of headquarters premises and other facilities by host countries</b>		
	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>For Action</b>
2	Legislative bodies of United Nations organizations should: (a) Remind the host countries of their legal obligations concerning the headquarters agreements and the benefits of the presence of United Nations organizations in their respective countries, and that the full implementation of headquarters agreements is also to their benefit; and (b) Request their respective executive heads to report back at appropriate intervals on the implementation of the headquarters agreements.	Governing Bodies
3	Executive heads of the United Nations system organizations should negotiate with and encourage the host countries to provide more generous facilities to the organizations in the acquisition or refurbishment of their headquarters premises by, for example, providing premises free of charge, or providing interest-free loans or sharing costs.	Secretariat
4	Legislative bodies of those United Nations system organizations that bear the full cost or part of the cost of major repairs and refurbishments of their headquarters premises should establish a special fund to ensure adequate financial resources for such repairs and refurbishments in their regular budgets, if they have not yet done so.	Governing Bodies
5	Legislative bodies of United Nations organizations headquartered in the same host country should: (a) Consider establishing a joint formal forum, similar to the Committee on Relations with the Host Country in New York, to enhance relations with the host country; and (b) Ensure that adequate resources are allocated from their regular budget to support the establishment and proper functioning of this formal forum.	Governing Bodies
7	Executive heads of United Nations system organizations should: (a) Remind the host countries of their obligations under the headquarters agreements to issue visas free of charge and in a timely fashion to staff and officials of United Nations organizations; (b) Encourage host countries to establish a reasonable time frame for the processing of visas, in collaboration with the organizations, so as to avoid delays and denials in the issuance of visas, especially to those officials and staff members who have been previously granted visas; and (c) Report back to the legislative bodies on progress made in this regard.	Secretariat

<b>JIU/REP/2006/4 - A second review of the implementation of headquarters agreements concluded by United Nations system organizations: Provision of headquarters premises and other facilities by host countries</b>		
	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>For Action</b>
<b>8</b>	The United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) should regularly review the practical implementation of privileges and immunities granted to international organizations, especially as far as the interpretation of such terms as “direct and indirect taxes”, “charges”, “levies” and “fees” is concerned, so as to ensure their uniform application by host countries in the context of headquarters agreements.	Secretariat
<b>10</b>	The legislative bodies of United Nations organizations should: (a) Allocate appropriate financial resources to ensure adequate and realistic security facilities in all their duty stations; and (b) Remind host countries of their obligation to provide adequate security for United Nations organizations premises and staff.	Governing Bodies

<b>JIU/NOTE/2005/2 - Review of the management of the United Nations laissez-passer</b>		
	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>For Action</b>
<b>3</b>	Heads of organizations must ensure that staff members responsible for handing out UNLPs do so only upon the signature and dating of the intended recipient.	Secretariat
<b>6</b>	Heads of organizations should: (a) discontinue the safe keeping of UNLPs by the organizations; and (b) employ the practice of withholding at least 50 per cent of one month’s salary of separating staff members until the UNLP is returned for cancellation.	Secretariat
<b>8</b>	Heads of organizations may advise their internal audit units to undertake an audit on the administration of UNLPs within the next budget period.	Secretariat



<b>JIU/NOTE/2006/1 - Goodwill Ambassadors in the United Nations system</b>		
	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>For Action</b>
<b>2</b>	In order to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of Goodwill Ambassadors programmes, executive heads of the organizations concerned should: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Rationalize their number;</li> <li>(b) Limit designations and renewal of services to only highly committed and available personalities of high calibre and renown;</li> <li>(c) Stop the practice of systematically adding new nominations each year;</li> <li>(d) Prior to renewing each two-year mandate, evaluate the job carried out by the Goodwill Ambassador, and its impact;</li> <li>(e) Limit total services to a maximum of 10 years, with exceptions granted on a case-by-case basis, based on merit and operational needs.</li> </ul>	Secretariat
<b>3</b>	To increase the impact and effectiveness of their communication strategy and avoid confusion within the targeted audience, executive heads should: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Apply, system-wide, solely the title of Goodwill Ambassador to celebrities designated to work on behalf of the Organization for a two-year period; other titles may be used exceptionally to designate royalty and celebrities working on ad hoc assignments;</li> <li>(b) Reserve the titles of "Messenger of Peace" and "Special Envoy" exclusively for nominations by the Secretary-General and avoid the use of any similar title to preserve its exceptional character.</li> </ul>	Secretariat
<b>5</b>	Executive heads should encourage self-financing by Goodwill Ambassadors of all travel-related expenditures whenever possible, and promote other no-cost arrangements in order to achieve recurrent savings that could be significant for some organizations.	Secretariat
<b>7</b>	In order to improve the effectiveness of Goodwill Ambassadors programmes, executive heads should ensure that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) The role of these celebrities is clearly established within the communication strategy of the organization;</li> <li>(b) Terms of reference, annual plan of activities and indicators of success are defined in line with programmatic priorities and agreed upon prior to the nomination/renewal of contracts, with the participation of substantive offices.</li> </ul>	Secretariat
<b>8</b>	Executive heads should: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Develop systems to track and report regularly on the impact of the activities of the Goodwill Ambassadors and Messengers of Peace;</li> <li>(b) Conduct periodic evaluations of the programmes to improve their efficiency.</li> </ul>	Secretariat

<b>JIU/NOTE/2006/1 - Goodwill Ambassadors in the United Nations system</b>		
	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>For Action</b>
<b>9</b>	<p>With the purpose of enhancing accountability among programme managers and increase cost-effectiveness, executive heads should:</p> <p>(a) Relate the funding of the Goodwill Ambassadors programmes to its measurable impact and return on investment, as a percentage of funds directly or indirectly generated by them;</p> <p>(b) Regulate pro bono services, such as partnerships with the private sector, at no cost to the organizations, in consultation with the respective legal offices, under the modality of Memoranda of Understanding;</p> <p>(c) Decentralize, as appropriate, the administration of the programmes to regional/country offices, whereas the headquarters should play a coordinating, advisory and monitoring role.</p>	Secretariat
<b>11</b>	Executive heads of organizations with common strategic goals and objectives should cooperate in organizing joint activities for Goodwill Ambassadors in order to target larger audiences and achieve greater impact at lower cost.	Secretariat